An unknown threat actor has been quietly mining Monero cryptocurrency on open source Redis servers around the world for years, using a custom-made malware variant that is virtually undetectable by agentless and conventional antivirus tools.
Since September 2021, the threat actor has compromised at least 1,200 Redis servers — that thousands of mostly smaller organizations use as a database or a cache — and taken complete control over them. Researchers from Aqua Nautilus, who spotted the campaign when an attack hit one of its honeypots, are tracking the malware as “HeadCrab.”
Sophisticated, Memory-Resident Malware
In a blog post this week, the security vendor described HeadCrab as memory-resident malware that presents an ongoing threat to Internet-connected Redis servers. Many of these servers don’t have authentication enabled by default because they are meant to run on secure, closed networks.
Aqua’s analysis of HeadCrab showed that the malware is designed to take advantage of how Redis works when replicating and synchronizing data stored across multiple nodes within a Redis Cluster. The process involves a command that basically allows administrators to designate a server within a Redis Cluster as a “slave” to another “master” server within the cluster. Slave servers synchronize with the master server and perform a variety of actions, including downloading any modules that might be present on the master server. Redis modules are executable files that administrators can use to enhance the functionality of a Redis server.
Aqua’s researchers found HeadCrab exploiting this process to load a cryptocurrency miner on Internet-exposed Redis systems. With the attack on its honeypot, the threat actor, for instance, used the legitimate SLAVEOF Redis command to designate the Aqua honeypot as the slave of an attacker-controlled master Redis server. The master server then initiated a synchronization process in which the threat actor downloaded a malicious Redis module containing the HeadCrab malware.
Asaf Eitani, security researcher at Aqua, says several features of HeadCrab suggest a high degree of sophistication and familiarity with Redis environments.
One big sign of that is the usage of the Redis module framework as a tool to perform malicious actions — in this case, downloading the malware. Also significant is the malware’s use of the Redis API to communicate with an attacker-controlled command-and-control server (C2) hosted on what appeared to be a legitimate but compromised server, Eitani says.
“The malware is specifically built for Redis servers, as it heavily relies on Redis Modules API usage to communicate with its operator,” he notes.
HeadCrab implements sophisticated obfuscation features to remain hidden on compromised systems, executes more than 50 actions in a completely fileless fashion, and uses a dynamic loader to execute binaries and evade detection. “The threat actor is also modifying the normal behavior of the Redis service to obscure its presence and to prevent other threat actors from infecting the server by the same misconfiguration he used to gain execution,” Eitani notes. “Overall, the malware is very complex and uses multiple methods to achieve an edge on defenders.”
The malware is optimized for cryptomining and appears custom-designed for Redis servers. But it has built-in options to do a lot more, Eitani says. As examples, he points to HeadCrab’s ability to steal SSH keys to infiltrate other servers and potentially steal data and also its ability to load a fileless kernel module to completely compromise a server’s kernel.
Assaf Morag, threat lead analyst at Aqua, says the company has not been able to attribute the attacks to any known threat actor or group of actors. But he suggests that organizations using Redis servers should assume a full breach if they detect HeadCrab on their systems.
“Harden your environments by scanning your Redis configuration files, ensure the server requires authentication and doesn’t allow “slaveof” commands if not necessary, and do not expose the server to the Internet if not necessary,” Morag advises.
Morag says a Shodan search showed more than 42,000 Redis servers connected to the Internet. Of this, some 20,000 servers allowed some sort of access and can potentially be infected by a brute-force attack or vulnerability exploit, he says.
HeadCrab is the second Redis-targeted malware that Aqua has reported in recent months. In December, the security vendor discovered Redigo, a Redis backdoor written in the Go language. As with HeadCrab, Aqua discovered the malware when threat actors installed on a vulnerable Redis honeypot.
“In recent years, Redis servers have been targeted by attackers, often through misconfiguration and vulnerabilities,” according to Aqua’s blog post. “As Redis servers have become more popular, the frequency of attacks has increased.”
Redis expressed in a statement its support for cybersecurity researchers and said it wanted to recognize Aqua for getting the report out to the Redis community. “Their report shows the potential dangers of misconfiguring Redis,” the statement said. “We encourage all Redis users to follow the security guidance and best practices published within our open source and commercial documentation.”
There are no signs that Redis Enterprise software or Redis Cloud services have been impacted by the HeadCrab attacks, the statement added.
Source: www.darkreading.com